Conflict and Resolution Over GAP

The Agency—The Arab League

As a member of the Arab League, I have been assigned to prepare this white paper on behalf of an exploratory committee regarding the intricacies and nuance of what has become of GAP-the Southeastern Anatolia Project-since its inception over 45 years ago. This multi-national project is of the utmost importance to the region in terms of providing hydro-electric power and potable water, bringing unity to the area, and showing Europe and the West of the Middle East’s ability to bring about progress in a peaceful, responsible manner. Many peoples and nations (Turkey, the Kurdish people, Syria, Iraq) have a vested interest in the successful completion of the project. The Arab League, therefore, holds an important role in maintaining open dialogue and fair outcomes to all parties involved.

The River Basin—The Origin of the Fertile Crescent

Southeastern Anatolia is a hotspot of politico-cultural conflict. The current conflict is best understood in the context of the region’s history—specifically Turk-Kurd relations and actions taken by both sides to achieve their respective goals. The two nations have been fighting each other since the 1920s, most of the effort coming from Turkey trying to assimilate the Kurds into their country. It has picked up especially severely since the late 1970s, when the Kurdistan Workers Party started committing violent acts in retaliation to Turkey’s actions.

Unfortunately for the Kurds, 4.3 million of them live in area (Harris). The flood zone of the largest dam included in GAP is home to 170,000 Kurds (Soffer 91). Hence, in context of a violent history of conflict with the government, the Kurds see the project as simply another attempt to clear them out of their own land (Ayboga).

Turkey is interested in the Southeastern Anatolia basin for its irrigation and hydroelectric power potential (Izady). The proposed agricultural benefits of GAP are substantial; with an estimated 2 million ha increase in irrigation land, quadrupling the current agricultural output. This is not only crucial in handling the rising population and the food requirements that come with it; but it also comes into play when considering trade potential with other countries in the region (Harris).

However, the Kurds are suspicious of the Turks; and rightly so based on past violence.

Therefore, there is trepidation on the part of the Kurds that they will not see much of the economic benefit from this state-run project. The fact that international support from the World Bank has been waning because of shortcomings on Turkey’s part for not “consulting with downstream states on water allocation” (Soffer 91) has further strengthened the Kurds argument that Turkey will divert the power from the hydroelectric dams away from the area, and use the agriculture from the irrigation to feed or pay those people not native to the area (Ayboga).

Turkey also claims to bring important advancements to the area in terms of health education, potable drinking water, and family planning to help curb the swelling population (Harris). From a developmental and sustainability standpoint, these are useful and important tasks to undertake as the country moves into the 21st century. A rapidly growing, yet poor lower class has huge potential to drain the state entitlement programs; becoming an unnecessary burden if the state is able to first foresee and stem it off. However, put in context of past conflict between the Kurdish nation and the Turkish state, attempts to improve health and family life are seen as a new strategy to undermine the Kurds from more control of the area (Ayboga).

Problematic Eminent Domain

Another problematic area is that of compensation for the more than 200,000 Kurds who have already moved out of the region (Soffer 91). Many of them are being relocated under precedent of eminent domain. Eminent domain states that when public works are planned, the government executing those plans has the right to offer the residents whom that project would displace current market value for their land would the public works not take place, but require them off of the property. For instance, in the United States, this precedent is often invoked for the building of a new freeway or the expansion of a city street. Houses and property privately held before the road is built would consequently be destroyed in the road-building process.

Eminent domain is challenging to the Anatolian Kurds for two main reasons. The first is that many Kurds do not have official paperwork proving their ownership of the land they are on—a sort of common law property right. They therefore are not eligible to receive compensation for land that is not theirs, which they have been living on and off of for hundreds of years. Turkey could potentially give them nothing in terms of compensation. Current practice dictates a “land-for-land” compensation model—simply giving the common law property owners different land than what they currently “own.” However, Turkey is offering old farms elsewhere in the country in return for the rich soils of the various dams’ flood areas. And whatever land outside of GAP that is suitable for productive use is already occupied (Ayboga).

Secondly, according to some accounts, those Kurds who are compensated for their land are not being paid enough for the new living arrangements that are provided by the Turkish government, (Ayboga). Two of the more popular relocation sites include Diyarbakir and Batman. Both are urbanized cities and do not reward the agrarian skills that the displaced Kurds have developed. Not only are they not paid fairly for their land, they are moved into an alien way of living without necessary skills to succeed (Ayboga). And so, through not making adequate compensation for those most seriously affected, Turkey and GAP do not bode well with international observers, effectively lowering their influence as evidenced by the World Bank’s withdrawal of support (Soffer).

Conflict with Downstream States

Unlike the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, the challenges associated with GAP are not halted at the border. This massive, $21 billion undertaking is causing problems with the downstream states of Syria and Iraq. While never threatening full stoppage and containment of the waters within her borders, Turkey has dammed up the flow without first asking permission. In early 1990, Turkey stopped the flow of the Euphrates behind the flagship dam of the 22, the Ataturk. For one month, the reservoir grew by 1.5 billion cubic meters of water. They did increase the water flow in the months leading up to the stoppage and warned Syria and Iraq that they wouldn’t have any water for a month. This allotment was not enough and the economies of both states suffered greatly because of it. Even after pleas from the Syrian and Iraqi governments, Turkey refused to open the spillways before their plans dictated and threatened a longer stoppage time. Luckily, the few years following the water halt brought heavier rains and snows than normal, mitigating some of the international anxiety. Actions such as these have violated the funding agreement that Turkey had with the World Bank and forced the state to cover more of the cost of the project than they had previously planned, delaying the operational status of many of the dams. (Soffer 91-3).

Solutions

Any widespread project that involves land, damming of rivers, and relocation of hundreds of thousands of native residents will naturally invite criticism and conflict. Unfortunately for Turkey and the Arab League, the economic benefits to Turkey do not completely off-set the injustices done to the Kurds and downstream states. Such a large project requires a cooperative effort for which Turkey, by herself, cannot compensate.

There is much room for out-reach on Turkey’s part. The country has done well to not further threaten cutting off water to Syria and Iraq. However, with such a lucrative project at stake, further efforts at sharing the resultant water and power with other groups and nations to ensure GAP’s success should be high among Turkey’s priorities. This would improve trade relationships with oil- and resource-rich Syria and Iraq. It would also allow support from the World Bank to be reinstated and get the various dams and power plants back on track.

In addition to economic advantages, Turkey should stay well aware of the recent changes in power in many of the countries of the Middle-East. With a violent population within her own border, the time is relatively right for such an uprising to take place. Providing better compensation and extending confirmed property rights to the Kurds would greatly decrease the chance of similar conflict to other countries happening inside Turkey’s borders.

With such a controversial and complicated series of events which have stemmed from GAP, the Arab League would do well to take this opportunity to resolve whatever problems exist. While there have been shortcomings in the execution of GAP, the overall outcome can still be salvaged for the good of all parties involved.

Works Cited
Ayboga, Ercan. "Turkey’s GAP and Its Impact in the Region." Kurdish Herald - The Independent Gateway to Kurdish News and Analyses. Web. 14 Feb. 2011. .
Harris, Leila M. "Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Project." Society and Natural Resources 15 (2002): 743-59. Web.
Izady, Mehrdad R. The Kurds: a Concise Handbook. Washington: Crane Russak, 1992. Print. As summarized on kurdistanica.com.
Soffer, Arnon. Rivers of Fire: the Conflict over Water in the Middle East. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Print.


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