"Rational Choice"

January 23, 2009--Rational Choice Theory
So here we’ve been spending time talking about Rational Choice in a very philosophical and theoretical way. We’ve asked important questions like “Where do our preferences come from?” and “Why do people make the choices they do?” and “Where do social patterns and order come from?” We’ve also picked it apart and identified certain ontological assumptions underlying the theory and critiquing those assumptions; the most important one being that humans are rational actors and we seek to “maximize our preferences,” whatever that means. However, one of the biggest, most glaringly obvious critiques that we have missed, unfortunately, pertains to this very conundrum of knowing what qualifies as “maximization of preference.” In order to know if one of these rational actors is maximizing his or her preferences, you have to 1) know what he or she is giving up when the decision is made and 2) quantify the satisfaction that is gained by the objective choice and also the satisfaction that could’ve been gained by another choice that would’ve been objectified if the actual choice had been foregone; and this is the only way to know if the unchosen choice should’ve been made.
How could we have missed this? After all, a measurable approach to the theory could prove it correct. Don’t we want to know what is true? We probably ignore this critique because other people have taken it up for us. They are called Economists. They do calculus and run regressions and measure GDP. They know how to maximize not preferences, but profits. Sociology got it started, and economics is finishing it. However, they are the only ones who can because they study measurable things. They can measure income and profit margins and cost differentials. Everything in the economy; labor, capital, time, natural resources; can be reduced to a dollar sign. But relationship utility is simply not liquid. We can’t compare relationships of different types and qualities because they are simply too complex for the implementation of a common denominator.
This is still kinda hard for us to accept, though. We like to be able to explain exactly why something occurred, and predict what is going to happen if we choose a certain path. That’s why we compare relationships to bank accounts, and how we need to make deposits before we make withdrawals. It is why I’m using such a thick explanatory way of writing right now. It is probably also why we have such a propensity to trust ourselves with as important things as politics and the economy and family relations. If I have my own interests in mind and want to do what is best for me, then I am always going to make the best decision. I am going to do wise things with my money and time and let the most qualified person boss me around (politics) and choose the best person to marry.
But sometimes we choose wrong. Wrong choices are manifested by uncontrollable debt and divorce; things we often experience. Despite this theory that says we won’t let bad things happen to ourselves because we are self-interested, we have to remember that self-interest is not only a function of who we are, but also when we are. We all change over time. That which we decide to hold in the highest priority (some would say that our priorities define us) changes. Self-interest is not a singular concept. It holds plurality inasmuch as one decision heavily influences many different times of our individual selves.
A smarter way to choose than “self-interestedness” might be “being-interestedness.” That is, we should act in ways that will contribute to the preference of our “being:” our future self, those who are close to us, those things that are most important to us, and our respective spouse to whom we are sealed.
Now, then, I call into question the definitions of “atomism” and “individual.” As mentioned above, an individual is not simply his or her own self. The fact that we are speaking in terms of sociology right now proves that we all are social beings. And “social beings,” semantically, implies multiplicity.